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INTRODUCTION 
 
On July 1, 1997, Thailand’s Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh’s government 
was not yet a year old, and the economy was in turmoil.  The baht had been under intense 
pressure from international speculators since February, and the banking system was 
wobbling under the weight of bad loans.  Depositors, fearing a collapse of the country’s 
smaller financial institutions, had shifted their money to the top five banks who, in an 
attempt to reduce risk and to conserve capital, had repaid their international loans and 
were no longer lending to the business sector.1  Moreover, the stock market, worried that 
many of the country’s property companies might be forced into bankruptcy, had declined 
by 45% since its peak in early 1996.2  
 
Yongchaiyudh had insisted on defending the value of the baht as well as 
supporting the country’s financial institutions, many of whose owners had helped elect 
him to office.  Now it appeared his economic policies had failed, and he had to chart a 
new course.  Amnuay Viravan, the well respected Finance Minister, who had resigned in 
frustration on June 19th, probably would have insisted on a policy of continuing to 
defend the baht, but Thanong Bhidaya, his replacement, was not as certain of that policy.   
 
THAILAND: AN ECONOMIC SUCCESS STORY 
 
The Prime Minister was proud of what his country had achieved.  During the 
1970s, Thailand, a small country located in the center of the Southeast Asian peninsula, 
was an unqualified economic success story.  Based on its ability to maintain high rates of 
saving and investment, Thailand was among the fastest growing and most successful 
developing countries in the world, experiencing average annual rates of growth in GDP 
of 7 percent or more every year.  But, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, rising interest 
rates and oil prices led to an economic slump.  Thailand’s annual GDP growth rate still 
remained higher than the average for middle-income countries, but its economic growth 
targets were not met. 
 
Deciding that further economic growth depended on the ability of the Thai 
government to improve economic efficiency through development planning, the 
government switched from import substitution to export promotion.  Thailand reduced 
non-tariff barriers, decreased the import surtax, and in November of 1984 devalued the 
currency to 25 baht per dollar.  In addition, approval procedures for foreign investment 
projects were simplified and generous investment incentive packages were offered.   
 
High levels of economic growth resumed.  Between 1986 and 1996, the annual 
average rate of growth in Thailand’s gross national product (GNP) was 9.5 percent, while 
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GNP per capita rose by 7.9 percent. 
 
In 1992, Thailand’s central bank, the Bank of Thailand, introduced a 
comprehensive program of financial reforms that were designed to position Thailand as a 
future financial center in the region and encourage competition among the country’s 
financial institutions.  At that time, Thailand’s banking system was comprised of 
commercial banks that handled the majority of all financial transactions in the country, 
and numerous finance and security companies that dealt with smaller borrowers.   
 
The measures proposed by the Bank of Thailand included the liberalization of 
exchange rate controls, the removal of legal ceilings on banks’ deposit and lending rates, 
and the improvement of prudential supervision according to international standards.  In 
addition, the reforms began the process of developing Thailand’s money and capital 
markets, and established the Bangkok International Banking Facilities.3  
 
THAILAND: A CAUTIONARY TALE 
 
The establishment of the Bangkok International Banking Facilities provided many 
of Thailand’s larger firms with easy access to offshore currency markets.  Businesses in 
Thailand found borrowing in these markets attractive because foreign interest rates, 
particularly U.S. rates, were lower than those in Thailand, and because Thailand’s pegged 
exchange rate minimized currency risk.  As a result, many Thai companies began to 
borrow dollars, convert the proceeds to baht, and invest in Thai assets.  Thailand’s banks 
and finance companies also borrowed large amounts abroad to lend at home to those 
smaller businesses that still did not have access to international capital markets.  As a 
result, beginning in 1993 the amount of foreign capital, much of it short-term, flowing 
into Thailand began to increase steadily.   
 
By the mid-1990s, the supply of foreign capital exceeded the country’s high 
return investment opportunities, and a significant portion of the foreign funds started to 
flow into more speculative projects.  Asset prices, especially stock market values, land 
values, and real estate prices rose rapidly.4 Moreover, the foreign capital inflow put 
upward pressure on the exchange value of the baht, requiring the Bank of Thailand to 
intervene regularly to ensure that the baht traded in a narrow band between 25.2 to 25.6 
baht to the U.S. dollar.   
 
The policy of supporting the pegged exchange rate was pursued in order to 
maintain Thailand’s competitive position in the region.  Rising wages and other costs had 
already forced many of Thailand’s low cost assembly businesses to move to countries 
with cheaper labor.5  The recession in Japan had cut into demand for Thailand’s products, 
and China, a rising competitor in the region, had devalued its currency in 1990, 1991, and 
again in 1994.  The rising baht compounded these problems, particularly during the 1995 
to 1997 period when the U.S. dollar gained 50 percent against the yen.  Export growth 
slumped badly in 1996, and a large and growing current account imbalance emerged.6  
 
THAILAND: A COUNTRY IN CRISIS 
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By the end of 1996, Thailand’s external debt levels were rising.  According to the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), foreign currency debt with a maturity of less 
than two years was equal to about 120 percent of Thailand’s foreign exchange reserves.7  
In addition, Thailand’s trade deficit was 8% of GDP.  As investor concern about these 
figures rose, (some observers pointed to the fact that Mexico’s trade deficit was 8 percent 
of GDP when its currency collapsed), the Thai government countered that neither 
circumstance presented Thailand with a serious long-term problem.  External debts, it 
claimed, were not a threat because unlike Mexico they did not result from large public-
sector imbalances or excessive consumption spending.  Thailand’s foreign borrowing was 
being used mainly to increase investment.8  Furthermore, the government claimed, 
Thailand had successfully financed large current account deficits for several years, and its 
high growth and high savings economy suggested no compelling reason that this could 
not continue.9  
 
Thai authorities pointed to the fact that savings were 35.3 percent of GDP, and 
that GDP growth, equal to 6.7 percent in 1996, had grown at a rate of 8.5 percent 
between 1990 and 1995.  The government budget surplus equaled 1.5 percent of GDP, 
and the inflation rate was 5.8 percent.  Moreover, the country’s debt was rated A3,10 and 
according to the Bank of Thailand, at the end of 1996 non-performing loans of the six  
largest commercial banks altogether accounted for only 6.98 percent of the total lending, 
a ratio that was not high by regional standards.11  
 
Crisis in the Banking Industry 
The banking crisis began on February 5, 1997, when Somprasong Land, a Thai 
property developer, announced that it had failed to make a scheduled $3.1 million interest 
payment on an $80 billion eurobond loan.12  Thai banks tended to be particularly 
vulnerable to collapsing property values because they made loans against collateral, not 
cash flow, and that collateral often was speculative real estate.  Figures released in 
December by the Bank of Thailand suggested that non-performing loans of all the 
country’s commercial banks had only grown from 6.92 percent to 7.73 percent of the 
total in the first six months of 1996.13  But, many observers believed that those figures 
were optimistic and that 10 percent or more of all commercial bank loans were probably 
bad.  They based these opinions on the fact that loans secured against property were not 
classified as bad until interest payments were a full year in arrears,14 as well as the fact 
that the property crisis was deepening.  At the beginning of 1997, empty property was 
estimated to be approximately 350,000 units in Bangkok and 850,000 units nationwide 
with more construction underway.15  
 
The problems in the country’s finance companies were thought to be even more 
severe despite the central bank’s assurances that the finance companies were in good 
condition.16 17 
 
The Government’s Response 
On March 3rd, the Bank of Thailand and the Ministry of Finance introduced new 
regulations designed “to prevent the problem of asset quality from casting doubts on 
financial institutions and to further strengthen the overall health of the financial sector.”  
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These regulations required all financial institutions to make full provision against 
possible loan losses.  In addition, financial institutions with insufficient liquidity were 
ordered to increase their capital immediately.  Any institution that was unable to increase 
its capital by itself was encouraged to turn to the Financial Institutions Development 
Fund,18 which would step in to purchase the increased shares.19 
 
The Financial Institutions Development Fund (The Fund) was a separate legal 
entity managed by the Bank of Thailand.  The Fund collected annual contributions from 
all financial institutions under the supervision of the Bank of Thailand at the ratio of 
0.2% of deposits, and under certain circumstances, was allowed to borrow from the Bank 
of Thailand.  The Fund also was permitted to lend money, take equities in certain 
institutions, and bail out troubled institutions by purchasing their non-performing assets.20  
 
The introduction of new banking regulations was followed on March 10th by an 
announcement from the Thai government that it would buy $3.9 billion in bad property 
debt from its financial institutions.21 To fund this buyout, the Cabinet approved the 
establishment of the Property Loan Management Organization (PLMO) to purchase 
property loans with collateral from financial institutions for the purpose of managing and 
enhancing their value.  The PLMO was to be established with registered capital of 1 
million baht to be appropriated from the government budget.  Its working capital, up to 
100,000 million baht, was to be raised through the sale of government-guaranteed bonds 
as approved by the Cabinet.  The bonds were to be sold to general investors.22  
 
The government argued that because the funds to finance the PLMO would come 
from market sources the measure was consistent with the government’s policy of 
maintaining strict fiscal and monetary discipline.  Financial institutions’ non-performing 
loans would be reduced while the public that bought property units would be protected by 
the continuation of the projects.  The authorities stated that they were “confident that this 
measure would positively strengthen the financial condition of the property sector while 
further strengthening the soundness of Thailand’s financial institutions.”23  
 
Thailand’s support of its financial institutions was not universally acclaimed.  A 
typical criticism was voiced by a German banker who noted that “The Thai mentality is 
that everything gets bailed out.  It isn’t good for market discipline, and it isn’t good for 
the banking system.  Market forces only work half way in Thailand.”24 
 
Thai Finance Minister Amnuay Virawan defended the government’s policies by 
saying, “We don’t take things to extremes.  We need to do things in between the Japanese 
and U.S. way.”25  Michel Camdessus, the Managing Director of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), responded to Thailand’s measures by saying, “I don’t see any 
reason for this crisis to develop further.”26  
 
On April 2nd, the Bank of Thailand took yet another step to stabilize the banking 
industry by endorsing the Thai Danu Bank and Finance One merger.27  Finance One, 
Thailand’s largest finance company, had pioneered the practice of issuing eurobonds 
denominated in U.S. dollars and using the proceeds to finance lending to the country’s 
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property developers.  The strategy was profitable so long as property values continued to 
rise, but when the property market began to collapse in 1996, and developers could not 
repay their loans, Finance One’s non-performing loans quadrupled.28 Estimates placed 
Finance One’s bad debt and investments at $600 million.29  
 
The merger with Thai Danu was intended to save Finance One from failing and 
was seen as a precedent for future consolidations among other Thai financial institutions, 
which over time would result in a stronger and more efficient financial system.  
Consequently, the government was prepared to facilitate the process by encouraging the 
Finance Ministry to clear tax obstacles that might prevent the merger from proceeding.  
In addition, the Financial Institutions Development Fund was expected to provide 
liquidity assistance and the Property Loan Management Organization to assist with any 
non-performing property loans.30 
 
Nevertheless on May 23, 1997, the Boards of Finance One and Thai Danu called 
off the merger because of legal problems and differing due diligence.  The Bank of 
Thailand immediately ordered Finance One to make provisions for sufficient reserves to 
cover their losses and to increase its capital.31  
 
Crisis in the Currency Market 
Although both foreign and local investors had begun to withdraw funds from 
Thailand’s financial markets in 1996,32 the currency crisis did not begin until February 
14, 1997.  At that time, many Thai borrowers began to hedge their currency exposure by 
entering forward contracts that obligated them to sell a specific amount of baht in the 
future in exchange for dollars at the current forward rate.  In addition, currency 
speculators, believing the Bank of Thailand did not have sufficient reserves to defend the 
currency, began to short sell the baht, hoping to force a devaluation.33  
 
In order to short sell the currency, the speculators borrowed baht from a financial 
institution and immediately resold those baht in the foreign exchange market for dollars. 
Counting on the value of the baht falling, the speculators expected to make a profit by 
spending fewer dollars to repay the financial institution than they received from the initial 
sale of the baht.  If, however, the baht did not fall but rose, the speculators stood to lose 
substantial sums of money. 
 
The Bank of Thailand responded to the attack by raising interest rates and 
instructing Thailand’s banks to limit the availability of the baht.  The Bank spent an 
estimated $500 million of its $39 billion in reserves defending the currency, and was 
believed to have bought several billion dollars worth of baht in the forward markets as 
well.34  
 
Faced with a shortage of baht, the speculators were forced to scramble for 
overseas baht in Singapore’s market in order to secure sufficient currency to meet their 
commitments.  The value of the baht peaked at 22-23 baht per dollar.35  
 
Despite the punishment inflicted on the speculators in February, by May 
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Thailand’s currency was again under attack.  This time the attack was triggered by a 
comment made by a senior economic advisor who, following a month of rumors that the 
Bank of Thailand had lost tens of billions of dollars defending the baht,36 suggested that 
devaluation might be necessary.37  
 
The Bank of Thailand emphatically denied that any change in the exchange rate 
mechanism was being considered and reaffirmed the government’s commitment to 
maintain the stability of the baht.38 39 Nevertheless, rumors that Finance Minister 
Amnuay Viravan would soon be dismissed and exchange rate policies would be changed 
persisted.40  The impression of confusion was “heightened by an emergency meeting on 
May 11, when the Prime Minister, Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, announced that he was going 
to take personal charge of the economy.”41  
 
To counter the attack on the currency, Thailand engaged in a joint action with 
Singapore in the foreign exchange market on May 14th, spending nearly $7 billion 
defending the baht’s peg.  The amount of reserves that the Bank committed at this time 
for future purchases of the baht was not disclosed, but rumors again put the figure in the 
billions.42  
 
The Bank also imposed informal exchange controls by prohibiting onshore 
financial institutions from lending baht to the offshore market.  This action effectively 
created a two-tier currency market, with one tier in Thailand and the other offshore, a 
situation that allowed offshore interest rates to soar.  In fact, in the offshore market, 
where speculators faced a sudden and severe shortage of baht, interest rates rose to 400 
percent.43 “I think they are using the big stick approach,” said Wong Yit Fan, Chief 
Economist for Southeast Asia at Standard Chartered Bank in Singapore.  “They want to 
hit speculators so very hard that they won’t think about speculating on the currency for 
another six months.”44  
 
The fact that the central bank chose to quell the currency speculation by imposing 
exchange controls made it clear that the government was unwilling to increase domestic 
interest rates by enough to slow the capital outflow.  In fact, on May 26th the Bank made 
the following statement as part of its Economic Outlook for 1997:  
 
“Progressive improvement has been observed on the stability front, both as regard 
inflation and the current account balance which are expected to continue.  Moreover, the 
Government has announced clear-cut measures to maintain fiscal discipline such as 
expenditure cutting from the 1997 budget and cautious budgeting for the 1998 budget, as 
well as measures to increase revenue to ensure a balanced budget for 1998.  
 
 Consequently, to achieve an appropriate policy mix between fiscal and monetary 
policy under present economic circumstances, the Bank of Thailand wishes to confirm 
that the Bank will closely monitor the situation and ensure sufficient liquidity in the 
system to finance normal economic and investment activities.”45  
 
The refusal of the central bank’s authorities to tighten further was grounded in 
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their belief that the tight monetary policy followed by the Bank of Thailand since 1995 to 
contain inflation and increases in the current account had worked as expected.  But, the 
coincidental sharp slowdown of exports and capital inflows in 1996, together with 
problems in some of Thailand’s financial institutions, had resulted in a rapid deceleration 
of investment and economic growth.46  Higher interest rates would surely result in a 
recession or worse. 
 
In addition, the central bank continued to blame many of their economic problems 
on external factors such as the press coverage of the crisis and the activities of currency 
speculators. “They blame the ills of the country, not on press freedom but on abuse of 
that freedom,” said Chatchai Yenbamrung, a media adviser to Chavalit and editor of 
Business Day, a Bangkok based daily.47  Mr. Amnuay Viravan, when asked about the 
crisis, claimed that Thailand was “facing a major threat from very greedy people.”48  
 
He was not alone in that sentiment.  Many people in Thailand were furious that 
wealthy foreigners were trying to bankrupt the country for personal gain.49  Thai 
authorities singled out George Soros, a well-known currency speculator, in particular, and 
in June it was reported that government authorities “gloated gleefully” over the losses its 
foreign exchange policies caused the speculators in May.50  
 
THE THAI CRISIS: END GAME 
 
The month of June opened with the Bank of Thailand disputing inaccurate reports 
and defending the government’s policies.  On June 1, the Bank categorically denied a 
report that it had proposed to the government that it should issue a special decree to force 
30 finance companies to merge.51 And, on June 11th, it derided a negative report about 
Thailand’s growth rate published by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia.   
 
The Bank claimed that “Any forecast of a negative growth rate for Thailand this 
year is simply “absurd” and “irresponsible,” especially when the conclusion has been 
drawn from pure speculation and prejudice, without any due regard for proper 
macroeconomic analysis.” The Bank insisted that the government’s fiscal and monetary 
policies were working as expected, including the exchange controls imposed in May, and 
that any economic slowdown was a “natural outcome” after a decade of high growth.52  
 
On June 19th, Thailand’s Finance Minister, Mr. Amnuay Virawan, frustrated by 
his inability to convince the Cabinet to raise taxes to help close an impending budget 
deficit, resigned.  The Thai stock market fell 2 percent on hearing the news.53  The Prime 
Minister said that he would step in as acting Finance Minister, while ruling out a 
devaluation of the baht. “We will never devalue the baht,” he said, and blamed the market 
for exaggerating the extent of Thailand’s difficulties.54  Nevertheless, some of the 
market’s worries seemed to be “shared by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose 
director on June 17th urged Thailand to take strong measures ‘as rapidly as  
possible.’” 55  Mr. Thanong Bhidaya, a man relatively unknown in Thai politics, was 
named Finance Minister on June 20th. 
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On June 27th, the central bank suspended the operations of 16 finance companies 
and ordered them to submit merger or consolidation plans.56 This order was confirmed on 
June 29th, when the Bank reported that it would not suspend any more finance and 
securities companies.  It also announced that the Minister of Finance and the Governor of 
the Bank of Thailand would make public statements on June 30, 1997 giving details of 
additional measures to ensure stability in the banking system, and that these plans would 
be submitted to the Cabinet for approval on July 1, 1997.57  
 
The suspension of the finance companies came as a shock to many international 
bankers.  Throughout the month of June, the Bank of Thailand had urged foreign bankers 
to continue lending to the finance companies, promising that they would be protected if 
any of those companies experienced problems.  Furthermore, the list appeared arbitrary, 
and rumors swept Bangkok that it was meant to be far more comprehensive.  “They shot 
themselves in the foot.” declared the branch manager for one international bank. “If they 
had done it right, the list would have been far larger.  But there was a lot of lobbying by 
politicians who had stakes in some of the finance companies to have their names 
eliminated.”58 
 
On June 30th, the Prime Minister appeared on television and assured the nation 
that there would be no devaluation of the baht, lest Thais “all become poor.”59 
Nevertheless, on July 2nd, the government of Thailand made the following 
announcement: 
 
NOTIFICATION OF THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE 
Re: Change of Foreign Exchange System 
By virtue of the power conferred upon him under section 8 Paragraph Three of the 
Currency Act, B.E. 2501, as amended by The Currency Act (No. 4), B.E. 2516, 
The Minister of Finance, upon the recommendation of the Bank of Thailand, 
hereby issues this notification as follows:  
The Notification of the Ministry of Finance dated 2 November B.E. 2527 Re: 
Change of Foreign Exchange System is hereby repealed. 
1. The foreign exchange system shall be such that the value of the Baht is set 
by conditions in foreign exchange markets. 
2. The Bank of Thailand shall engage in buying and selling of foreign 
currency for the purpose of maintaining the stability of the Baht under the 
system mentioned in 2. 
3. The Bank of Thailand shall from time to time as deemed necessary, 
publish the exchange rates between the Baht and foreign currencies for use 
as a reference rate in conversion of foreign currencies into Baht. 
Given on 2 nd July B.E. 2540 
(signed)     Thanong Bhidaya 
Minister of Finance60 
 
Following the announcement, the value of the baht fell 20 percent, igniting an 
economic crisis.  Devaluation meant that the country’s foreign currency debt, much of 
which was unhedged, had suddenly became considerably more costly to service.  Given 
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the long-lived stability of the baht, borrowers had expected the baht-dollar exchange to 
remain fixed.   Now, with the baht being allowed to float, those borrowers had to pay 
significantly more in baht to service their foreign loans, causing some firms to close with 
many others facing imminent bankruptcy.61  Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, 
after initially balking at the idea, sought help from the IMF.   
 
The IMF extended a $10 billion loan to Thailand and helped Bangkok arrange up 
to $5 billion more from other sources, most of them Japanese banks.  The money was to 
be used to boost Thailand’s foreign-currency reserves and to help fund the current-
account deficit.  The prevailing sentiment was that the existence of the loan would be 
enough to stem the crisis. “The actual money is unimportant,” said one government 
official, “Whether it was $5 billion or $50 billion would hardly make a difference.  Once 
we accept IMF austerity measures and impose fiscal discipline, banks around the world 
would be willing to lend us what we need.”62 
 
For its part the government began to follow the IMF’s advice.  On Aug 5th, it 
suspended the operations of 42 finance companies, bringing the total number temporarily 
closed since June to 58.  Bangkok also promised to abide by an austerity program that 
required the government to trim the budget by $3.1 billion, cut the current account deficit 
to 5 percent of GDP in 1997 and 3 percent in 1998, keep foreign reserves above $25 
million, and raise taxes.  They also agreed to speed up the privatization of state assets and 
to allow foreigners to own a majority state in the country’s financial institutions.63 
 
Thailand’s neighbors welcomed the IMF bailout.  Should Thailand implode, they 
would have had considerable difficulty convincing the world that their currencies and 
economies were not next in line.  Many feared that Thailand’s politicians would not have 
the political courage to tackle the country’s property glut and banking crisis. “This is the 
bitter medicine Thailand needs,” said U.S. based Ismail Dalla, a Thai-born Indian fund 
manager who once worked with the World Bank.  “What the IMF is doing is forcing on 
Thailand the fiscal discipline it has always lacked.”64 
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Exhibit 1 
Thailand: Major Economic Indicators 
 
 1990 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Growth, Investment, Savings & Consumption:      
Annual % Growth in GDP1 11.75 8.34 8.79 9.24 6.41 
GDP, constant prices, billion baht2 1,945 2,473 2,695 2,933 3,095 
GDP, current prices, billion baht2 2,183 3,170 3,630 4,188 4,598 
GDP per capita, current prices, baht2 39,104 54,650 61,840 70,520 76,634 
GDP per capita, PPP, current $1 4,000 5,325 5,827 6,492 6,873 
Gross Capital Formation, % of GDP1 41.1 40.0 40.3 42.1 41.8 
Gross Domestic Savings, % of GDP1 33.8 35.8 35.4 35.4 35.5 
Total Consumption, % of GDP1 66.4 63.9 63.7 63.8 64.7 
      
Government Finance2      
Overall Budget Surplus/Deficit, million baht 105,505 59,713 97,368 126,247 43,303 
Domestic Borrowing, net, million baht -11,864 -44,347 -58,872 -30,574 -25,123 
Foreign Borrowing, net, million baht -39,217 -4,353 -17,426 -4,855 -3,665 
      
Money and Banking      
Money & Quasi Money Growth, annual %1 26.68 18.38 12.86 17.01 12.57 
Real Interest Rate, %1 10.25 11.84 9.42 n.a. n.a. 
Commercial Rate, %2 19.00 14.50 14.38 16.25 15.25 
Deposit Interest Rate, %2 12.25 8.62 8.45 11.58 10.33 
Inflation, Consumer Prices, annual %1 5.97 3.38 5.16 5.16 5.71 
      
Foreign Sector      
Exports, goods & Services, annual % growth1 11.7 12.3 14.6 14.8 2.4 
Exports as a % of GDP 34.1 38.0 38.9 41.8 39.3 
Imports as a % of GDP 41.7 42.2 43.7 48.6 45.5 
Merchandise Exports, million US$2 22,881 36,553 44,649 55,731 54,677 
Merchandise Imports, US$2 -29,493 -40,606 -48,041 -63,360 -63,834 
Direct Investment & other Long-Term Capital, 
million US$2 
 
3,195 
 
3,268 
 
-622 
 
4,887 
 
7,390 
Portfolio Investment & Other Short-Term Capital, 
million US$2 
 
4,946 
 
6,813 
 
-1,089 
 
5,795 
 
7,111 
Gross International Reserves, billion US$1 14.26 25.44 30.28 36.94 38.64 
Official Exchange Rate, baht per $, average1 25.59 25.32 25.15 24.92 25.34 
External Indebtedness, Total, million US$2 28,088 52,668 65,522 83,166 90,824 
External Indebtedness, Long-term, million US$2 19,765 30,034 36,343 42,071 53,210 
External Indebtedness, Short-term, million US$2 8,322 22,634 29,179 41,095 37,613 
 
Sources: 1. World Bank, World Development Indicators, CD-ROM, 1998; 2. Asian Development Bank, 
http://internotes.asiandevbank.org/notes/tha/THAFIN.htm, and /THANACT.htm. 
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